Joint replacements are the #1 expenditure of Medicare. The process of approving these medical devices is flawed according to the Institute of Medicine. It is time for patients' voices to be heard as stakeholders and for public support for increased medical device industry accountability and heightened protections for patients. Post-market registry. Product warranty. Patient/consumer stakeholder equity. Rescind industry pre-emptions/entitlements. All clinical trials must report all data.
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Showing posts with label preemption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label preemption. Show all posts

Friday, April 25, 2014

Medical Device Manufacturers' Role in U.S. Broken Health Care System



FORBES   PHARMA & HEALTHCARE | 4/24/2014 @ 1:00PM |1,911 views
Robert Pearl, M.D.
Health care costs are dramatically higher in the U.S. than in the rest of the world. Yet our health care outcomes – from life expectancy to infant mortality – are average at best. There is little dispute over these facts.
The real debate comes when we ask why. While there isn’t one single answer, the rapidly rising cost of drugs and medical devices is a significant factor.
And the magnitude of this problem is likely to spike in the future if not properly addressed.
Pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers have been criticized for their role in health care for over a decade. Little has changed. Americans pay significantly more for prescription drugs and medical devices than patients in the rest of the world.
The justifications for these extraordinarily high prices vary, but the industry is well aware that most patients have no choice but to pay whatever they charge.

Pricing Not Always Justified, Even For Better Products
Pharmaceutical pricing has long been a point of contention among manufacturers, patients and payers of health care (including insurers, employers and unions).
The U.S. drug patent system allows a drug discoverer to exclusively sell the new drug for an extended time period. Theoretically, this protection is designed to encourage new medical discoveries and enable a drug or device company to recoup its R&D investment.
Because the theory makes sense, drug manufacturers use it to defend their prices. Certainly, those higher prices could be justified for developing clinically superior products but, all too often, the added cost far exceeds the incremental benefit.
How does drug pricing work? It’s hard to say. Pharmaceutical pricing is opaque. Drug manufacturers aren’t asked to quantify their costs or compare them to projected sales and profits. Business school students learn that the price of a product isn’t determined by what’s reasonable but what the market will bear. A wide array of drug pricing examples would indicate that pharmaceutical and medical device companies hire a lot of business school graduates.

How One Drug Might Earn Its Maker A 2,500% ROI
Take sofosbuvir, a new drug used to treat Hepatitis C. It’s marketed as Sovaldi by Gilead Sciences.
As a more effective treatment of Hepatitis C than those available today, this drug will be a positive addition to the physician’s armamentarium. Its effectiveness at ridding the body of this virus justifies a higher price than the treatments available today.
But at $1000 a pill, its pricing is exorbitant, monopolistic, and disrespectful to the purchasers and patients who will bear the brunt of the massive cost.
It is estimated that total treatment costs will range from $84,000 to $200,000 per patient, depending on treatment length. That’s 10 to 20 times the cost of today’s approach. Is this a reasonable return for the company?
Drugs this expensive are typically produced for those with rare conditions. These “orphan drugs” should cost more per patient because of the limited treatment population. But Hepatitis C is a very common disease. It affects nearly 4 million Americans, according to the American Liver Foundation. So, this can’t be the reason.

High development costs are another oft-cited explanation for extremely high drug pricing. Typically, manufacturers don’t disclose exact R&D costs but Gilead is reported to have paid $11 billion for Pharmasset, the drug company that developed the medication that led to Sovaldi. From this purchase price, we can estimate the R&D costs of this drug.
At Sovaldi’s price-point, Gilead is estimated to recoup its total investment in less than 18 months with revenue estimates of $269 billion over the drug’s lifespan.
That would be a 2,500 percent return on investment.
Manufacturers of luxury cars or yachts can rightfully charge wherever they choose, but when patients in need have no alternative option, that’s just wrong. Interestingly, two other drugs with similar therapeutic responses will be available in the near future. It will be fascinating to see how they’re priced.
Compounding the high price of many medications is the reality that patients in others countries don’t pay nearly as much as those in the United States. The reason is that most governments across the globe regulate drug prices. To date, the U.S. Congress has prohibited the practice here.
The result is that drug sales in the U.S. subsidize a disproportionate share of a drug company’s research costs and contribute to much of the company’s margin, regardless of where in the world it is headquartered. If we want our businesses to be globally competitive, this needs to change.

Aggressive Advertising Gives Manufacturers An Edge
Clinically superior products may very well warrant incrementally higher prices. But what of the increasing prices for products that don’t add much value?
Let’s compare the laparoscope to the prostate robot. First, the laparoscope.
In the past, removing a patient’s gallbladder required a large abdominal incision. Then along came a new technologically enhanced laparoscopic removal with remarkably better results. Suddenly, rather than making an incision under the entire right rib cage and cutting through the abdominal muscles, surgeons could remove the gallbladder with two tiny punctures and a telescope-like device.
Before, the surgeon would have to leave large rubber drains in place for several days to reduce the risk of infection. Average recovery times took up to six weeks. In contrast, gallbladder removal today is a routine, minimally invasive outpatient procedure that most people recuperate from in a week.
Laparoscopic surgery was a miracle advancement. Hardly the same story as the prostate surgery robot.
Mention “robot” to most patients and they’ll assume it’s a space-age advancement with major clinical benefits. It sounds sexy and, intuitively, its approach to prostate surgery makes sense. After all, the robot has steady hands and requires a smaller incision.
The problem is the outcome data doesn’t support the hype or the cost. The results – in terms of both cancer eradication and surgical complications – are similar to traditional alternatives, according to most studies. And for most surgeons, the robot-assisted procedure takes longer.


The price tag for this device is over $1 million, but that’s just the beginning. The company behind the robot designed it with disposable “arms” and built in an obsolescence factor that forces the hospital to replace each arm after 10 uses. The motivation isn’t safety. It’s profit. The manufacturer could have built a robot that could complete 100 procedures. But that would reduce profits dramatically.
If the robots add little clinical value yet significantly increase costs, why do so many hospitals tout them? The answer: Aggressive advertising.
By simultaneously marketing to consumers and hospitals, these devices were strategically positioned to help hospitals lure patients from their competitors. And, of course, it worked. Big billboards helped early adopting hospitals attract patients with the promise of a new “high-tech wonder.” Once a few hospitals jumped on board, others had no choice but to follow.

Since the robot’s introduction, academic medical centers (university hospitals) train their surgical residents almost exclusively in its use. Gone or going are the more traditional methods. Unless patient expectations change or expanded competition is permitted, this will ensure that the manufacturer sees a large revenue stream for decades to come.
The result: This device will drive up health care costs significantly in the future, while clinical outcomes remain relatively unchanged.

Minimally Different Drugs Launched At Maximum Prices  
Even when a new product is essentially the same as an old one, manufacturers use their patent protections and market control to drive up revenues. A great example is an injectable drug for a medical problem called “wet macular degeneration.”
Manufactured by Genentech, Avastin is an FDA-approved drug for cancer treatment. It slows the growth of new blood vessels that feed a tumor.
A while back, a thoughtful group of ophthalmologists recognized that if this drug could limit blood-vessel proliferation to stop tumor growth, it might also be useful in slowing the overgrowth of blood vessels inside the back of the eye – the cause of wet macular degeneration.
These physicians tried injecting a very small dose of Avastin at about $60 per treatment with excellent clinical results.
But here’s where it gets interesting. Genentech recognized the same opportunity at about the same time. And instead of recommending Avastin as an effective treatment, Genentech created Lucentis, a new drug with a biologically active component identical to Avastin.
Once Genentech received FDA approval, it priced Lucentis at $2,300 a dose, never showing that it was superior to Avastin at $60 a treatment.
Ophthalmologists across the country were outraged. Adding insult to injury, Genentech tried to embargo sales of Avastin for non-oncology practices. Not surprisingly, when the National Eye Institute tested Lucentis against Avastin, it found essentially no difference for a drug priced 40 times higher.

Change Is Possible, Not Easy
There are legitimate reasons why some drugs and devices are very expensive. But it’s common for manufacturers to hike up prices even when the magnitude of improvement is minimal.
If we’re serious as a nation about making health care more affordable while increasing quality outcomes, we’ll need to rein in these practices.
We can begin by demanding that drug companies disclose the true cost of development as part of the FDA approval process. Regulatory agencies could then use that information to evaluate the appropriateness of the price.
The FDA could also require all new agents and devices to be tested against existing approaches so that pricing and incremental value can be measured. Finally, we can make all of this information available and transparent to patients, so they can make the best decisions for themselves.

Health Care Is Different From Retail, Needs To Be Treated As Such
Outside of health care, people can choose whether to pay inflated prices for a patent-protected technology or minimally better products. But patients don’t have that same choice – at least not without facing potentially serious health consequences.
No doubt, patent protection for drugs and devices needs to protect the company and the investments it has made. But their economic gain must be balanced against a certain level of social responsibility. Unfortunately, that balance doesn’t exist today and change will be hard to accomplish in this current political environment.
Elected officials receive large campaign contributions from “Big Pharma,” preventing legislative change. Hospitals hype new technologies to attract more patients, even when the benefit is marginal and cost is exceedingly high. And at the first sign of resistance, drug companies spend millions on direct-to-patient advertising while continuing to wine and dine doctors (even with the implementation of the Sunshine Act, which is designed to prevent these practices).

However, there may be a flicker of hope. Recent public disclosures of new Hepatitis C medication prices have sparked national debate. Congressional leaders are starting to question drug manufacturers’ pricing schemes. And maybe this time, greed has exceeded reason. Maybe there will be regulatory backlash. But patients and employers will need to demand it.
Americans should understand that these exorbitant health care costs are not free. They come out of their paychecks and reduce the amount of public services the government can provide.
Our health care system is broken and – given the drug pipeline aimed at maximizing prices and profits – the problems will get worse if change doesn’t happen soon.


This article is available online at:

Contributor


As a CEO, practicing physician and business school professor, I have a unique perspective on the business of health care and the culture of medicine. My passion is helping people understand the interactions and consequences of these powerful forces. I am the CEO of The Permanente Medical Group – the largest medical group in the nation – and CEO of the MidAtlantic Permanente Medical Group. In these roles, I am responsible for 9,000 physicians, 35,000 staff and the medical care of 4 million Americans living on both the west and east coasts. I am chair of the Council of Accountable Physician Practices (CAPP), a board-certified plastic and reconstructive surgeon, a clinical professor of surgery at Stanford University, and on the faculty of the Stanford Graduate School of Business where I teach courses on strategy, leadership, and health care technology. I received my M.D. from the Yale University School of Medicine and completed my residency in Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery at Stanford. Follow me on Twitter @RobertPearlMD.

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

Lawyers win on $2.5B J&J hip settlement

By BARRY MEIER  The New York Times
Published: November 19, 2013
                                     
Johnson & Johnson and lawyers for patients injured by a flawed hip implant announced a multibillion-dollar deal Tuesday to settle thousands of lawsuits, but it was not clear whether the deal would satisfy enough claimants.
Under the agreement, the medical products giant will pay some $2.475 billion in compensation to an estimated 8,000 patients who have been forced to have the all-metal artificial hip removed and replaced with another device.
Separately, the company has agreed to pay all medical costs related to such procedures, expenses that could raise the deal’s cost to Johnson & Johnson to some $3 billion, said people familiar with the proposal.
The typical patient payment for pain and suffering caused by the device will be about $250,000 before legal fees, under the plan. Based on standard agreements, plaintiffs’ lawyers would receive about one-third of the overall payout, or more than $800 million, with those who negotiated the plan emerging as big winners.
The settlement plan, which was submitted to a federal judge in Toledo, Ohio, on Tuesday, must receive the support of 94 percent of eligible claimants to go forward. Whether it will reach that goal is unclear. Under the deal, some patients will receive relatively small payouts and others will see payments reduced because the plan imposes a user’s fee on awards based on how long a patient had the implant.
Some patients, many of whom who suffered severe pain and injury from metallic debris generated by the debris, spent years trying to convince doctors there was a problem while Johnson & Johnson was denying one.
The now-recalled device, known as the Articular Surface Replacement, or A.S.R., ranks as one of the most-flawed medical implants sold in recent decades. The DePuy Orthopaedics division of Johnson & Johnson estimated in an internal document in 2011 that the device would fail within five years in 40 percent of the patients who received it.
Traditional artificial hips, which are made of metal and plastic, typically last 15 years or more before requiring replacement. DePuy recalled its device in mid-2010 amid rising failure rates.
The A.S.R. was sold in two versions, one for use in traditional hip replacement and the other for use in an alternative procedure known as hip resurfacing. Beginning in 2003, it was implanted in about 93,000 patients, about one-third of them in the United States.
The A.S.R., which had a metal ball and a metal cup, sheds metallic debris as it wears, generating particles that have damaged tissue in some patients or caused crippling injuries.
The precise value of the settlement is not known because it will vary based on the number of plaintiffs who qualify for it.
DePuy faces some 12,000 A.S. R-related legal claims in the United States. Lawyers estimate that about 8,000 of those claims involve patients who underwent operations to have an A.S.R. removed and replaced.
The remaining plaintiffs, about 4,000 patients, will not receive any compensation, though there is a provision to add $250,000 to the deal for each patient who undergoes a replacement procedure before the plan is finalized. The lawyers believe that Johnson & Johnson will probably have to make a subsequent settlement with added patients as the device fails in them.
Thus far, only two A.S.R. lawsuits have gone to trial. In March, a Los Angeles jury ordered DePuy to pay $8 million in damages to a Montana man after finding that the A.S.R. was defectively designed. Then in August, a Chicago jury sided with DePuy and rejected claims that it had inappropriately marketed the implant.
Under the plan announced Tuesday, the $2.475 billion payment by Johnson & Johnson would be divided into two pots.
The deal would create a $2 billion pool to cover basic awards and a separate $475 million pool to cover additional payments to compensate those patients who sustained more significant injuries related to the device or its removal and replacement.
The average basic award of $250,000 will be affected by a variety of factors. Under the plan, plaintiffs who smoke, are overweight or are older will see their payments reduced.
In addition, patients who had the device longer will also see reductions. For example, the average payment to a patient who had the device for five to six years would fall to $225,000 and be reduced to $200,000 for a patient who had the device six to seven years.
For patients who qualify for the special pool, their payouts would increase based on the severity of their injuries. Lawyers do not know what the number of patients would be to qualify for the pool but they estimate that the figure might be about 10 percent of claimants.
Some of the patients included in the pool would be individuals who had A.S.R.'s on both hips or who had a hip so badly damaged by the device that a procedure to replace it was not completely successful.
Johnson & Johnson’s decision to separately pay all medical costs related to a device replacement is unusual, lawyers said. Typically, such costs are part of a settlement award and a claimant is then liable for paying back an insurer or Medicare for their medical costs.

If the deal is approved, the biggest single payment will probably go to a group of lawyers who negotiated the plan. Under the plan they could receive a 6 percent fee, or about $150 million.
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More information:
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DePuy Announces U.S. Settlement Agreement to Compensate ASR™ Hip System Patients Who Had Surgery to Replace Their ASR Hip
WARSAW, IN, November 19, 2013 – DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. (DePuy) and the Court-appointed committee of lawyers representing ASR™ Hip System plaintiffs today announced a settlement agreement to compensate eligible ASR patients in the United States who had surgery to replace their ASR hip, known as revision surgery, as of August 31, 2013.
“We are committed to the well-being of ASR patients, as demonstrated by the voluntary recall and the program providing support for recall-related care,” said Andrew Ekdahl, Worldwide President, DePuy Synthes Joint Reconstruction. “The U.S. settlement program provides compensation for eligible patients without the delay and uncertainty of protracted litigation.  DePuy remains committed to our purpose of advancing innovative treatment options to serve those who need joint replacement surgery.”
The U.S. settlement is valued at approximately $2.5 billion, based on an estimate of 8,000 patients participating in the program.  The amount of the settlement program has been included as part of previously accrued amounts, and no additional charge to the company’s earnings is being recorded in connection with this settlement.  Any remaining related established product liability reserve is based on currently available information and changes to the reserve may be required in the future as additional information becomes available.  The majority of the payments related to this settlement are projected to occur during 2014 from currently available cash.
U.S. Settlement Program
For U.S. ASR Patients Who Had Surgery to Remove Their ASR Hip As of August 31, 2013
The U.S. settlement program is available for U.S. ASR patients who had revision surgery for reasons related to the recall as of August 31, 2013.  Patients eligible for this program can speak with their lawyer, if they have one, or contact the U.S. settlement program claims processor at www.USASRHipSettlement.com or (877) 391-3169.  ASR patients do not need a lawyer to participate in the program. 
For U.S. ASR Patients Who Have Surgery to Remove Their ASR Hip After August 31, 2013
For U.S. patients who have revision surgery after August 31, 2013, the existing Broadspire program providing support for recall-related care is available.  U.S. patients are encouraged to call 1-888-627-2677 for more information. 
For more information about the U.S. settlement program, please visit www.ASRHipInfo.com.
Status of Litigation
Judge David Katz of the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Ohio is presiding over the federal multidistrict litigation.  The consolidated state litigations are presided over by: Judge Brian Martinotti of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County; Judge Deborah Mary Dooling of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; and Judge Richard Kramer of the San Francisco County Superior Court, California.  The settlement agreement was presented to these judges and Maryland State Court Judge, the Honorable Crystal Dixon Mittelstaedt, at a court hearing today. 
The settlement agreement will help bring to a close significant ASR litigation activity in the U.S.  However, some lawsuits in the U.S. will remain. DePuy will continue to defend against remaining claims and believes its actions related to the ASR Hip System have been appropriate and responsible. 
Recall Background
In August 2010, DePuy issued a voluntary recall of the ASR Hip System after receiving new information from the UK National Joint Registry as part of the company’s ongoing surveillance of post-market data concerning the ASR Hip System, which showed a revision rate that was not in line with data previously reported in that registry.  The product continues to perform well in some patients.  Since the recall decision was made, DePuy has worked to provide patients and surgeons with the information and support they need, including the global program providing support for recall-related care, which has thus far resulted in thousands of payments to patients.
DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. is part of DePuy Synthes Companies of Johnson & Johnson.
(This release contains “forward-looking statements” as defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  The reader is cautioned not to rely on these forward-looking statements.  These statements are based on current expectations of future events.  If underlying assumptions prove inaccurate or unknown risks or uncertainties materialize, actual results could vary materially from the expectations and projections of DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson.  Risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, general industry conditions and competition; economic factors, such as interest rate and currency exchange rate fluctuations; technological advances, new products and patents attained by competitors; challenges inherent in new product development, including obtaining regulatory approvals; challenges to patents; significant adverse litigation or government action; impact of business combinations; financial distress and bankruptcies experienced by significant customers and suppliers; changes to governmental laws and regulations and domestic and foreign health care reforms; trends toward health care cost containment; increased scrutiny of the health care industry by government agencies; changes in behavior and spending patterns of purchasers of health care products and services; financial instability of international economies and sovereign risk; disruptions due to natural disasters; manufacturing difficulties or delays; complex global supply chains with increasing regulatory requirements; and product efficacy or safety concerns resulting in product recalls or regulatory action.  A further list and description of these risks, uncertainties and other factors can be found in Exhibit 99 of Johnson & Johnson’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 30, 2012.  Copies of this Form 10-K, as well as subsequent filings, are available online at www.sec.gov, www.investor.jnj.com or on request from Johnson & Johnson.  Neither DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. nor Johnson & Johnson undertakes to update any forward-looking statements as a result of new information or future events or developments.)
Visit www.ASRHipInfo.com for more information.
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Press Contacts:
Lorie Gawreluk
732-524-1413
lgawrel1@its.jnj.com
Mindy Tinsley
574-372-7136
mtinsley@its.jnj.com
Investor Contacts:
Louise Mehrotra
732-524-6491
LMehrot@its.jnj.com

Lesley Fishman
732-524-3922
LFishma@its.jnj.com

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November 19, 2013
DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. (DePuy) and the Court-appointed committee of lawyers representing ASR™ Hip System plaintiffs today announced a settlement agreement to compensate eligible ASR patients in the United States who had surgery to replace their ASR hip, known as revision surgery, as of August 31, 2013.
Contact Information - U.S. Settlement Program Claims Processorwww.USASRHipSettlement.com
(877) 391-3169
claimsprocessor@usasrhipsettlement.com

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J&J to pay $2.5B to settle hip-replacement lawsuits

By Jaimy Lee  Modern Healthcare
Posted: November 19, 2013 - 5:30 pm ET

Johnson & Johnson will pay about $2.5 billion to settle thousands of lawsuits filed by patients who already underwent surgery to replace the company's faulty metal-on-metal hip implants, which failed at higher rates than traditional hip implants and were eventually recalled.

About 8,000 patients who had revision surgery before Aug. 31 are part of the settlement, the New Brunswick, N.J.-based healthcare company said. More patients who received Johnson & Johnson's metal-on-metal hip implants are expected to undergo revision surgeries in the future.


"The U.S. settlement program provides compensation for eligible patients without the delay and uncertainty of protracted litigation,” said Andrew Ekdahl, worldwide president of the DePuy Synthes Joint Reconstruction business unit, which is part of Johnson & Johnson.

The settlement was announced Tuesday after the agreement was presented to the judge overseeing the federal multidistrict litigation consolidated in U.S. District Court in Toledo, Ohio.

The settlement comes just weeks after Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay $2.2 billion to settle allegations that it illegally marketed the antipsychotic drug Risperdal and two other medications.

Johnson & Johnson, which noted that there are still some ongoing lawsuits in the U.S., said that no additional charge to the company's earnings will be recorded as a result of the settlement.

The standard payment for patients who claim a share of the settlement is $250,000. The award may be reduced based on age, smoking status, and the length the device was implanted. Patients may get more than $250,000 if they needed multiple revisions or experienced complications such as a heart attack or pulmonary embolism associated with the revision. They must register their claims by Jan. 6.

About 93,000 people, including roughly 12,000 in the U.S., received the ASR XL Acetabular hip implant or the ASR hip resurfacing system, according to Johnson & Johnson's most recent financial filing. DePuy Orthopaedics, a Warsaw, Ind.-based subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, recalled the metal-on-metal systems in August 2010. It is also facing lawsuits from patients in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

Metal-on-metal hip implants have failed at higher rates than traditional implants with plastic bearings, prompting the Food and Drug Administration this year to propose regulations that would require manufacturers of market metal-on-metal hip implants test to provide more information about the safety and effectiveness of these devices.

Patients who received the metal-on-metal implants have reported a number of injuries, including adverse local tissue reactions and high ion concentrations of cobalt and chromium. The revision surgeries typically cost about $100,000.

Dr. Geoffrey Westrich, director of research for the adult reconstruction and joint replacement division at the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York, said patients having problems with the implants generally experience three types of responses. Some clearly need revision surgery. Others are not symptomatic or suffering any pain, but MRIs indicate that they have adverse tissue reactions and elevated metal ion levels. Those patients may also need revision surgery, Westrich said. A third group of patients may have slightly elevated ion levels and need to be monitored.

“There is no definitive answer what to do,” Westrich said. “Without regular follow-ups, we're not going to know who needs a revision.”

About 400,000 people received hip implants in 2011, including the roughly 50,000 people who have revision surgeries each year, said Dr. Josh Jacobs, president of American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons. While the revision procedures are fairly common, they are often not as successful as primary implants, he said.

Follow Jaimy Lee on Twitter: @MHjlee