Joint replacements are the #1 expenditure of Medicare. The process of approving these medical devices is flawed according to the Institute of Medicine. It is time for patients' voices to be heard as stakeholders and for public support for increased medical device industry accountability and heightened protections for patients. Post-market registry. Product warranty. Patient/consumer stakeholder equity. Rescind industry pre-emptions/entitlements. All clinical trials must report all data.
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Twitter: @JjrkCh
Showing posts with label medical device safety. Show all posts
Showing posts with label medical device safety. Show all posts

Monday, June 6, 2016

USA Patient Network-Advanced Patient Training Workshop June 3-4, 2016


I (Joleen Chambers) attended this excellent workshop last weekend (photo above).  Every patient should have this information BEFORE taking any drug or being treated with any medical device!  Dr. Diana Zuckerman, President of the National Center for Health Research hosted the workshop and these are her presentation slides.  I also must thank PCORI (Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute) for awarding partial financial support to the host organization of this workshop.  
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Monday, May 2, 2016

Why Patients Don't Hear About Failed Medical Devices Until It Is Too Late . . .

Media mystery: Why did journalists ignore an important study on a costly, harmful back pain procedure?

April 20, 2016 (FiDA highlight)

Kevin Lomangino is the managing editor of HealthNewsReview.org. He tweets as @KLomangino.

What qualifies as “news” in the topsy-turvy world of health care can be a real head-scratcher sometimes.
A few weeks ago, the New York Times reported in some depth about a two-week, 9-person study of bicyclists headlined, Chocolate Can Boost Your Workout. Really.
Really?
That kind of coverage is exasperating. Especially when you consider that last week, I could find no mainstream news coverage — nada, nothing — about a 10-year, award-winning study that, according to several knowledgeable experts, has tremendous clinical and financial implications for the treatment of back pain in the United States.
The study was titled, “Does provocative discography cause clinically important injury to the lumbar intervertebral disc? A 10-year matched cohort study.”
But that title apparently wasn’t provocative enough for journalists on the health care beat.
It’s a shame the researchers couldn’t find a way to work the word “chocolate” into their study.
High costs and potential for harm
Provocative discography” is a diagnostic procedure that’s used up to 70,000 times a year in the United States at great cost to the health care system. It’s commonly performed on patients with so-called “degenerative disc disease” who are considering spinal fusion surgery — a $40 billion per year industry in the U.S. In an attempt to pinpoint the disc that’s causing problems, the surgeon will typically do a pressurized injection of the suspect disc and one or two non-degenerated control discs.
Experts say that provocative discography has no proven benefit for identifying symptomatic discs and has previously been shown on magnetic resonance imaging to be associated with faster degeneration of injected discs. The new study followed 75 patients who received the injections and compared them to 75 matched controls. The point of the new study was to see whether the disc degeneration seen on MRI would translate into clinically important back pain symptoms.
There was no significant history of back pain in either group when the study began. But the new 10-year data showed that there were more back pain surgeries (16 vs. 4); more frequent sciatica and back pain syndromes, and greater work loss and doctor visits for low back pain in the punctured discs compared to controls.
More pain. More surgery. More costs.
All with a procedure that’s still performed tens of thousands of times a year.
But no news coverage.
An expert asks: “Why would providers perform this test?”
James Rickert, MD, an orthopedic surgeon and contributor to HealthNewsReview.org, called it a “very important study.” The study has limitations, Rickert noted, including the fact that 40 out of the 150 patients were lost to follow-up during the 10-year study period.
“But readers should be aware that a trial of this sort with 10 years of follow up is very compelling evidence of discography’s potential problems,” Rickert says. “Such long term studies are rare,” he adds, and this one should tell readers: “Do not go undergo provocative discography.”
Patients looking for relief are subjected to all sorts of tests but provocative discography is the most invasive, and, typically, causes some insult to structures that are either normal or are not pain generators for the patient.  Add in the low diagnostic yield for patients, why would providers perform this test?
Similarly, Steven Atlas, MD, MPH, another HealthNewsReview.org contributor, likened the issue to a “house of cards” that’s finally beginning to topple. He noted that responses to provocative discography depend upon a variety of factors including the physician’s technique for performing the procedure.
So, not surprisingly, results are not very reliable. We also know that patients who have fusion based upon findings of provocative discography don’t do any better than individuals who have surgery but don’t undergo this test. We also know that patients can report more pain after the procedure, including pain they didn’t have before the procedure. And now we know that there are long-term risks associated with discography.
Mark Schoene, editor of The Back Letter as well as a HealthNewsReview.org contributor, emphasized that the study also threatens companies developing new biologic treatments that might help fix degenerated discs.
Most of these companies are planning to deliver those therapies via disc injection. The compounds they will inject, however, often have large-size molecules and will require large-bore needles—as large or larger than the needles employed in [these] studies. This suggests that these therapies may actually cause harm through the acceleration of disc degeneration.
Schoene said that companies producing these therapies are fearful that the studies may prompt the FDA to alter its safety standards regarding these injections—and order long-term human safety studies. Human studies of these injections would take a decade or more to perform and “could stop this new business in its tracks,” he said.
Few vested interests pushing reduction of unnecessary care
The news media weren’t entirely silent on the issue of back pain last week. The Minneapolis Star Tribune had a hard-hitting exposé on Medtronic’s Infuse bone graft device. It asked why more than a thousand adverse events associated with the device weren’t reported to the FDA.
A handful of stories (HealthDay, WebMD) also reported on a pair of New England Journal of Medicine studies (see here and here) looking at clinical outcomes for spinal fusion surgery. They reported that the more invasive and costly fusion surgery isn’t any better than a simpler surgery known as decompression for patients with pain resulting from spinal arthritis.
But the silence about provocative discography is provocative. With such huge implications, how can this critical study have received no mainstream media coverage? (The study was, after all, the subject of a news release put out by the North American Spine Society that should’ve pinged journalists’ radars.)
Rickert says it mainly comes down to who’s willing and able to invest in publicity for these studies.

“When a clinical trial shows positive results for a test/procedure, the manufacturer deploys an army of salesmen and media specialists and publicists to publicize the data,” Rickert notes. “That doesn’t happen with studies that call existing procedures/tests into question.”

Monday, January 4, 2016

Pelvic Surgical Mesh Regulation: Too Little, Too Late!


FDA strengthens requirements for surgical mesh for the transvaginal repair of pelvic organ prolapse to address safety risks

For Immediate Release
January 4, 2016
FiDA highlight & comment
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration today issued two final orders to manufacturers and the public to strengthen the data requirements for surgical mesh to repair pelvic organ prolapse (POP) transvaginally, or through the vagina. The FDA issued one order to reclassify these medical devices from class II, which generally includes moderate-risk devices, to class III, which generally includes high-risk devices, and a second order that requires manufacturers to submit a premarket approval (PMA) application to support the safety and effectiveness of surgical mesh for the transvaginal repair of POP.
The orders will require manufacturers to address safety concerns, including severe pelvic pain and organ perforation, through a rigorous PMA pathway to demonstrate safety and effectiveness. The actions apply only to mesh devices marketed for the transvaginal repair of POP. These orders do not apply to surgical mesh for other indications, like stress urinary incontinence (SUI) or abdominal repair of POP.
“These stronger clinical requirements will help to address the significant risks associated with surgical mesh for repair of pelvic organ prolapse,” said William Maisel, M.D., M.P.H., deputy director of science and chief scientist for the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health. *
“We intend to continue monitoring how women with this device are faring months and years after surgery through continued postmarket surveillance measures.”
Surgical mesh has been used by surgeons since the 1950s to repair abdominal hernias; in the 1970s, gynecologists began implanting surgical mesh for the abdominal repair of POP and, in the 1990s, for the transvaginal repair of POP. In 2002, the first mesh device with this indication was cleared for use as a class II moderate-risk device, and there are five manufacturers who are currently marketing this product.
Over the past several years, the FDA has seen a significant increase in the number of reported adverse events associated with the use of surgical mesh for transvaginal POP repair, and an advisory panel of experts recommended in 2011 that more data is needed to establish the safety of the device. The FDA has since taken several actions to warn doctors and patients about the use of surgical mesh for transvaginal POP repair.
Manufacturers of surgical mesh to treat POP transvaginally will have 30 months,(June 2018) as required by federal law, to submit a PMA for devices that are already on the market. Manufacturers of new devices must submit a PMA before those devices can be approved for marketing.
POP occurs when the muscles and tissue of the pelvic floor become stretched, torn or weakened and can no longer support pelvic organs such as the bladder, bowel or uterus; as a result, the organs drop from their normal position and bulge (prolapse) into the vagina. While not a life-threatening condition, women with POP often experience low back pain or pelvic pressure, painful intercourse, constipation or urinary problems such as leakage or a chronic urge to urinate.
Doctors may perform surgery on women with POP who have significant symptoms, often using a minimally invasive transvaginal technique to reduce recuperation time. Surgical mesh may be permanently implanted during this surgery to reinforce the weakened pelvic floor muscles and repair POP, but over the past several years the FDA has received thousands of reports of complications involving the use of mesh for transvaginal POP repair. The most common problems reported include severe pelvic pain, pain during intercourse, infection, bleeding, organ perforation and urinary problems from mesh eroding into surrounding tissues.
To warn doctors and patients about the use of surgical mesh for transvaginal POP repair, the FDA has:
  • Issued safety communications in 2008 and in 2011 warning doctors and consumers about an increase in adverse event reports related to mesh used for urogynecological procedures;
  • Convened an advisory panel in September of 2011 to solicit recommendations on actions to take regarding urogynecologic surgical mesh for transvaginal POP repair;
  • Issued orders to manufacturers in January 2012 to conduct postmarket surveillance studies to address specific safety and effectiveness concerns related to surgical mesh used for transvaginal repair of POP; and
  • Issued two proposed orders in May 2014 to reclassify the devices from class II to class III and to require manufacturers to submit a PMA application.
Manufacturers may choose to submit a PMA before the 30-month deadline.


The FDA, an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, protects the public health by assuring the safety, effectiveness, and security of human and veterinary drugs, vaccines and other biological products for human use, and medical devices. The agency also is responsible for the safety and security of our nation's food supply, cosmetics, dietary supplements, products that give off electronic radiation, and for regulating tobacco products.

http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm479732.htm?source=govdelivery&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery

Thursday, October 22, 2015

Ad hoc: FDA 'Surveillance' of Implanted Medical Devices


How Safety Concerns About Essure Reveal A Path To Better Device Tracking

October 15, 2015
On September 24, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) convened a public advisory committee meeting to discuss safety concerns about the Essure — a permanent birth control device that is implanted in the Fallopian tubes in order to create a tissue barrier and prevent pregnancy. The meeting of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Devices Panel was prompted by complaints submitted to the manufacturer (Bayer) and the FDA about unusual side effects—including patient deaths—and other health concerns that were not reflected in the labeling.
The ad hoc nature of such meetings, as a reaction to over 5,000 complaints, is a product of the U.S.’s current device surveillance system which itself is ad hoc in nature. Once a device is approved for market, the FDA relies heavily on these voluntarily submitted complaints in order to flag any potential adverse effects not identified during initial testing — a system that, the agency acknowledges, may be “incomplete, inaccurate, untimely, unverified, or biased.” In recent years, the FDA has renewed its efforts to actively strengthen or revamp this system.
At the September 24 Essure meeting, medical device experts reviewed the complaints alongside scientific data from two post-market studies conducted by the manufacturer. Conspicuously absent from the discussion at this meeting, however, were the volumes of real-world objective data that should theoretically be collected—systematically, quickly, and cheaply—from health systems and health plans like ours.
Unfortunately, the main reason we at Geisinger Health System in Pennsylvania and other similar systems cannot quickly and routinely access that data today is that most clinical information systems (e.g., claims databases, billing systems, and electronic health records) reliably track surgical procedures but not the specific brand and model of the implantable device a patient receives. Essure, however, is a unique case which provides us with a preview of what a truly robust device tracking system would allow through the use of device-specific information integrated into these databases.
Essure As A Unique Test Case For Unique Device Identification
Electronic health records, billing, and claims records are not currently focused on tracking individual devices; instead, they depend upon standardized procedure codes (e.g., Current Procedural Terminology [CPT] or the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System [HCPCS]) to track a patient’s health care encounters. For most procedures, knowing what surgery a patient had doesn’t help you know what particular device they received. The procedure code for a hip replacement surgery could mean the patient received any one of dozens of brands and models of prosthesis currently on the market.
Essure is a serendipitous exception to that typical scenario. Since its approval by FDA in 2002, there has been only one competing device on the market for the same indications, and thus only one other product associated with the same procedure codes as Essure (e.g., CPT 58565). That competing device, the Adiana system manufactured by Hologic Inc., was approved in 2009 and withdrawn in May 2012, meaning that for the majority of its lifespan, the Essure has been the only medical implant on the market using a particular subset of procedure codes.
With unique procedure codes, it is possible to track the patients who received Essure (and their medical care post-surgery) in a way that is currently prohibitively difficult for the vast majority of other medical implants. Because claims and medical records lack specific device information, they are typically not a very useful resource for device researchers or policymakers. But in this rare instance of Essure, it may have been possible to utilize those data sources to analyze this product’s safety profile.
What Claims And Electronic Records Can Tell Us
At Geisinger Health System, we have easy access, via a centralized data warehouse, to data from both the managed care company (Geisinger Health Plan) and a provider/facility network (Geisinger Clinic) that have used electronic health records since 1996 via a centralized data warehouse. We examined these records to answer a few key questions about the history of Essure use among our patients and members.
Searching the health plan’s records from January 2006 until June 2015, we found 67 health plan members who unambiguously must have received the Essure because of their procedure code. (This excludes 20 patients who had the procedure during 2009-2012 when the Adiana device was competing with Essure, although those patients may have received the Essure, too.) When searching the provider/facility network, there were an additional 118 patients who had an Essure procedure at a Geisinger hospital during that timeframe using a different type of insurance, bringing the total number of Essure patients to 185.
So what do we know about these 185 patients?
  • All 185 are still alive.
  • None of the 185 women have had the device subsequently explanted.
  • We did not obtain contact information (e.g., phone, address) for these 185 patients for the purpose of this article, but we could have if needed, and in central Pennsylvania where the out-migration rate is traditionally very low, that contact information is very likely (though not guaranteed) to be current.
  • Taking an ever-so-slightly deeper dive into the data, we can see that between their initial surgery and today, there were a total of 38 women (20 percent) with some evidence of unwanted events: 20 (11 percent) were newly diagnosed with abdominal or pelvic pain, 16 (9 percent) with heavier menstrual bleeding, 1 with device complications such as migration or breakage, 2 with postoperative infection, 2 with uterine perforation, and 2 became pregnant after receiving the device.
We realize this broad analysis is overly simplistic, and we do not imply causation between the new diagnoses and the Essure device itself, particularly the pain and bleeding which can be more common symptoms of other conditions.
Note, however, that we completed all of the above analysis—from raw data extract to final counts—in a matter of hours, not days or weeks, highlighting the minimal time and effort needed to answer basic questions about this device’s utilization history. The answers to those basic questions could be a first step toward determining whether more rigorous investigation is justified. We believe that our ability to quantify these “real-world” outcomes so easily shows what is possible when standard codes in claims, billing, and electronic health data can link individual patients to a specific device.
Why Can’t We Get The Same Level Of Detail On Other Devices?
In the digital age, many patients likely assume their medical implants (particularly the life-saving ones) are meticulously logged by their health care providers for easy future reference. The reality is much more complex.
To illustrate this complexity, we examined two other commonly-used implants in our health system: hip replacements and knee replacements. Over the past eight years (since 2007), 6,535 members of our health plan received a primary hip or primary knee replacement, 4,191 of which were implanted at non-Geisinger hospitals. An additional 4,544 patients had one of these procedures done at a Geisinger hospital, paid for by a non-Geisinger insurance plan, for a total affected population of 11,079 patients. This is a substantial number of “our” members or patients who could potentially be affected should a safety issue arise with one of these implants. Unlike with the Essure, however, for the 4,191 insurance members who had joint surgery elsewhere, we have absolutely no ability to identify within our existing records which model (or even manufacturer) of implant they received.
For the remaining patients who did have surgery at a Geisinger hospital, discrete implant information theoretically should have been captured in the operating room suite software, but the reality falls short. We were unable to find discrete documentation (i.e., not counting scanned images or text notes) of the manufacturer and model for the devices used in 995 (14 percent) of these surgeries. We attribute this sizable shortfall to the many challenges encountered in the operating room, including non-standardized labeling, sometimes-confusing packaging with multiple identification numbers, manual keyboard entry of information, and the pressure on operating room staff to develop workarounds when necessary to expedite the surgery. In any case, the consequences are that that for roughly half of “our” affected patients with joint replacements, we cannot easily determine what implants they have.
What Can Be Done?
The FDA has taken preliminary steps towards a strengthened medical device surveillance system with the phased introduction of Unique Device Identification (UDI) numbers for all medical products. The UDI will replace the current practice whereby manufacturers choose their own model or serial numbers (which could be duplicative across different manufacturers): a 2013 FDA final rule required labels to bear a UDI that conforms to a standard format and uniquely distinguishes that device from any other on the market.
The implementation of this rule will be phased in over seven years; September 24, 2015 (coincidentally the same day as the Essure meeting) was the date after which labels of all implantable, life-supporting, and life-sustaining devices must bear a UDI. Lower risk devices will follow suit in the coming years. The disconnect, however, from the perspective of health care providers and payors, is that the mere presence of a UDI number on a label may not mean that it actually enters the patient’s medical record or insurance claims.
Adding the UDI number to product packaging is not enough to improve our knowledge about devices, unless:
  • Hospitals and health systems are committed to capturing and tracking that information;
  • Health care software vendors work with those hospitals to help store and retrieve the information; and,
  • Data standards organizations, such as Health Level Seven (HL7) and the Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X12, help to develop tools for communicating that information between systems.
Integrating UDI all the way along the information pipeline including claims would allow us—and other researchers that utilize health plan data—to evaluate devices much in the same way that we utilize claims information for other purposes, such as examining prescription drug use and subsequent outcomes . Many organizations working to incorporate UDI into claims—including Aetna, the Society of Thoracic Surgeons, the American College of Cardiology, the National Association of ACOs, the Pew Charitable Trusts, and many others—argue that including UDI numbers in claims will provide better real-world data to evaluate long-terms outcomes associated with specific products.
Some have suggested that claims data are imperfect because patients may switch health plans or lack insurance, but as our demonstration highlights, claims data are already used for analysis and can provide earlier warning signs of product failures. Upgrading claims to accommodate UDI requires updates to the standard form used by all hospitals and health plans, a form that is updated by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), based on standards proposed by ASC X12. The form is updated infrequently with the next update expected in 2019 or 2020. Missing that window would delay the inclusion of this information—and analyses similar to our Essure demonstration—for at least a decade.
The main outcome of the September 24 FDA meeting—where testimony was heard from the Agency, the manufacturer, and a parade of witnesses and where a formal panel vote was not taken—was the recommendation that further study was needed. Even as the FDA considers the safety of a device that has allegedly harmed thousands of women, we should also consider how to identify problems with products more proactively.
Health care data such as claims and electronic medical records can provide that capability in a fraction of the time required to conduct a traditional surveillance study, but only efficiently and robustly once UDI data are added. Due to its 100 percent market share and an anomaly in its medical coding, Essure gives us a glimpse of how simple it could be if all device types could be discretely and uniquely linked to the experience of the patients who use them.

http://bit.ly/1MVv8KR

COMMENTS
Response to “How Safety Concerns About Essure Reveal A Path To Better Device Tracking”

  1. Laura Henze Russell says: 
  2. This is an excellent article. I testified at the FDA Essure Panel hearing. I did not have Essure, but have experience with another device illness due to biocompatibility issues, as have friends and associates. Even with Univeral Device Indicators, FDA regulations are still in the dark ages when it comes to patient safety. Patients need written information on materials composition and health risks, the right of written informed consent, pre-screening for biocompatbility to ensure it is “right for you” before a device is installed, and recourse and responsibility to fix things when they go wrong, instead of federal preemption that blocks responsibility to replace a device that is “wrong for you” through no fault of your own.